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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
RMETROACTIVITY oF O'CALLAHAN V. PAFXER

United States ex rel. Flemings v. Chafee
Since O'Callahan,v. Parker1 was decided by the Supreme Court,
military personnel prosecuted for crimes that are not "service connected ' 2 have been entitled to trials in civilian courts and the constitutional safeguards that attend such proceedings. A question that the
Court has yet to answer is whether O'Callahanshould also be applied
retroactively."
1395 U.S. 258 (1969).
2 Id. at 272. O'Callahan was convicted of an attempted rape of a young Hawaiian girl
while on evening pass. Certiorari was limited to the question
Does a court-martial... have jurisdiction to try a member of the Armed Forces
who is charged with commission of a crime cognizable in a civilian court and
having no military significance, alleged to have been committed off-post and
while on leave, thus depriving him of his constitutional rights to indictment by

a grand jury and trial by a petit jury in a civilian court?
Id. at 822 (1969). The Court noted that the Constitution had given Congress the
power to "make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces."

U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, di. 14. The Court also noted that the fifth amendment specifically
exempts military cases from the requirement of indictment by grand jury and, by infer-

ence, from the right to trial by petit jury. Justice Douglas, who wrote the majority opinion,
described these rights as the "constitutional stakes in the present litigation" (395 U.S. at

261-62) and made a lengthy comparison of the two court systems, criticizing such aspects
of military tribunals as the lack of provisions for life tenure and salary protection for
judges, the replacement of the jury by a panel of officers empowered to act by a two-thirds

vote, the possibility of command influence over the outcome of trials, and different rules
of evidence and procedure. Id. at 263-66.
The opinion concluded that
dJetermining the scope of the constitutional power of Congress to authorize trial
y court-martial presents another instance calling for limitation to "the least
possible power adequate to the end proposed."
395 U.S. at 265, quoting United States ex reL Toth v. Quarles, 350 US. 11, 23 (1955).
The Court described the military trial as "marked by the age-old manifest destiny
of retributive justice" (395 US. at 266) and held that a crime must be service related in
order to create court-martial jurisdiction.
3The Supreme Court was faced with this issue in Relford v. United States Disciplinary
Commandant, 401 U.S. 355 (1971), but did not reach it since it found that the crime in
question was service-connected. However the case is significant in that the Court defined
"service connected" in terms of 12 factors that would deprive a military court-martial of
jurisdiction to hear a case:
1. The serviceman's proper absence from the base.
2. The crime's commission away from the base.
3. Its commission at a place not under military control.
4. Its commission within our territorial limits and not in an occupied zone of a
foreign country.
5. Its commission in peacetime and its being unrelated to authority stemming
from the war power.
6. The absence of any connection between the defendant's military duties and
the crime.
7. The victim's not being engaged in the performance of any duty relating to the
military.
8. The presence and availability of a civilian court in which the case can be

prosecuted.
9. The absence of any flouting of military authority.
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The Second Circuit, in United States ex rel. Flemings v. Chafee,4
held that a retroactive application is required since the rationale for
O'Callahanwas that military tribunals lacked subject matter jurisdiction over such offenses. 5 Furthermore, the court stated that, even without the jurisdictional rationale, it would have reached the same result
by applying the standards presently used to determine whether new
constitutional rules of criminal procedure should be applied retro6
actively.
Since 1916, when Congress provided for military trials for civilian
offenses committed by those in the armed services, 7 an incalculable
number of cases have been tried under the assumption that the courtmartial had proper personal and subject matter jurisdiction." A retroactive application of O'Callahanwould place the validity of a great
number of these military convictions in doubt.9 The administrative
as well as pecuniary problems raised thereby are probably the foremost
concern of those who would deny retroactive application."0
10. The absence of any threat to a military post.
11. The absence of any violation of military property.

12. The offense's being among those traditionally prosecuted in civilian courts.
401 U.S. at 865.
4458 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. granted, 407 U.S. 919 (1972).
5 Id. at 556. In O'Callahan the government contended that the test of whether a defendant is subject to a court-martial is one of status, that is, "whether the accused in the
court-martial proceeding can be regarded as falling within the term 'land and naval
Forces.'" 395 U.S. at 267, citing Kinsella v. Singleton, 861 U.S. 284, 241 (1960). Mr. Justice
Douglas answered the contention by stating that military "status" is a necessary jurisdictional predicate but "it does not follow that ascertainment of 'status' completes the inquiry,
regardless of the nature, time, and place of the offense." 895 U.S. at 267.
6 458 F.2d at 552. The court stated that such a conclusion was not necessary to the
holding, but that it felt obligated to reach this issue since other courts have held O'Callahan to be prospective on this basis.
7 Act of Aug. 29, 1916, ch. 418, § 8, 89 Stat. 664.
8 See Mercer v. Dillon, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 264, 267-68, 41 C.M.R. 264, 267-68 (1970).
9 Id. But see Blumenfeld, Retroactivity After O'Callahan:An Analytical and Statistical

Approach, 60 GEo. L.J. 551, 578-80 (1972), where the author produces statistics tending to
refute this viewpoint.
10 See Mercer v. Dillon, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 264, 41 C.M.R. 264 (1970);
The practical effect of voiding earlier convictions will often be to grant immunity
from prosecution as a result of State statutes of limitations having run, witnesses
having been scattered and memories having been taxed beyond permissible limits.
A: reliable estimate of the number of court-martial convictions that could be
overturned by retroactive application of O'Callahan is nearly impossible to secure.
For one fiscal year of 1968, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force conducted
approximately 74,000 special and general courts-martial ....

The range of relief

could be extensive, involving such actions as determinations by the military departments of whether the character of discharges must be changed and consideration of
retroactive entitlement to pay, retired pay, pensions, compensation and other
veterans' benefits.
Id. at 267; 41 C.M.R. at 267-68. This analysis is cited by the Fifth Circuit in Gosa v.
Mayden, 450 F.2d 758 at 766 (5th Cir. 1971), and the Tenth Circuit in Schlomann v.
Moseley, 457 F.2d 1228 at 1280 (10th Cir. 1972). Similar reasoning underlies the decisions
in Thompson v. Parker, 808 F. Supp. 904 (M.D. Pa. 1970), appeal dismissed, No. 18,868
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The doctrine of prospective application of newly declared constitutional principles is of relatively recent vintage. Until Linkletter v.
Walker," the Supreme Court had uniformly applied new constitutional rules to all cases.' 2 Since Linkletter, the Court, in a series of
cases, has elaborated on the criteria for determining whether a decision
is to apply prospectively or retroactively.'" However, the Court has also
(3d Cir. Apr. 24, 1970); Bell v. Clark, 308 F. Supp. 384 (E.D. Va. 1970) (dictum); and
Williamson v. Alldridge, 320 F. Supp. 840 (W.D. Okla. 1970) (dictum). See also Nelson and
Westbrook, Court-MartialJurisdictionOver Servicemen for "Civilian Offenses": An Analysis
of O'Callahan v. Parker, 54 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1969); Note, The Sword and Nice Subtleties
of ConstitutionalLaw, 3 LOYOr.A U.L. REv. 188 (1970); 2 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 106 (1970);
44 TULANE L. REV. 417 (1970); 21 S.C.L. REv. 781 (1969).
11381 US. 618 (1965). Linkletter refused retroactive application to Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961), which held that, because of the operation of the fourth amendment
through the fourteenth, states were required to exclude evidence obtained by means of
illegal searches and seizures. The Linkletter Court concluded that the Constitution neither
prohibited nor required retrospective effect and formulated the following criteria:
In short, we must look to the purpose of the Mapp rule; the reliance placed upon
the Wolf doctrine; and the effect on the administration of justice of a retrospective
application of Mapp.
All that we might deide today is that though the error complained of might be
fundamental it is not of the nature requiring us to overturn all final convictions
based upon it.
381 US. at 636, 639-40.
12458 F.2d at 549, citing Linkletter. In Eskridge v. Washington Prison Board, 357
US. 214 (1958), the Court held that the indigent defendant's right to a free transcript on
appeal of his conviction was fundamental to the ascertainment of the truth. Eskridge
granted retroactive application of Griffin v. Illinois, 351 US. 12 (1956). In Pickelsimer v.
Wainright, 375 U.S. 2 (1963), the Court applied the rule of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 US.
335 (1963), to pre-Gideon convictions, thereby giving it full retroactivity. In Daegele v.
Kansas, 375 US. 1 (1963), the Court gave the Douglas v. California, 372 US. 353 (1963), rule
concerning the right of the indigent defendant to counsel on appeal, retrospective application. In Gideon and Jackson v. Denno, 378 US. 368 (1964) (voluntaries of confession), the
appeals were before the Court on writs of habeas corpus. The Second Circuit notes that
"[t]o our knowledge, the Supreme Court always has applied new rules announced in
habeas corpus cases retroactively." 458 F.2d 556, citing both Gideon and Jackson. Since
O'Callahan's appeal was also on a writ of habeas corpus, a strong argument could be made
that O'Callahanis retroactive by virtue of that fact alone. But see note 40 infra.
13 In Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 US. 406 (1966), the Court refused
retroactivity to Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). That case had denied to the states
the right to comment on a defendant's failure to testify in a criminal action. The opinion
distinguished Tehan from cases involving denial of counsel (which were given full retroactive effect) by pointing out that the denial of counsel presented a "dear danger of convicting the innocent." 382 US. at 416.
After Tehan came Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 US. 719 (1966), in which the Court
refused retroactive application to Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) and Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The cases dealt with statements and confessions made by
defendants in cases where they were without counsel and had not been advised of their
right to counsel. The Court stated:
We here stress that the choice between retroactivity and nonretroactivity in no
way turns on the value of the constitutional guarantee involved ... We also stress
that the retroactivity or nonretroactivity of a rule is not automatically determined
by the provisions of the Constitution on which the dictate is based. Each constitutional rule of criminal procedure has its own distinct functions, its own background
of precedent, and its own impact on the administration of justice, and the way
in which these factors combine must inevitably vary with the dictate involved...
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indicated that there is no rigid constitutional rule requiring either
application. 14 Furthermore, these standards have been strictly limited
Finally, we emphasize that the question whether a constitutional rule of criminal
procedure does or does not enhance the reliability of the fact-finding process at
trial is necessarily a matter of degree.
884 U.S. at 728-29.
Following Johnson came Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967). Stovall refused retroactivity to United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) and Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263
(1967), which dealt with validity of pretrial identification procedures in the absence of
counsel. In giving the reliance and effect portions of the equation more weight in this
instance, the Court restated the criteria for determining retroactivity:
(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards,
(b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards,
and
(c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the
new standards.
888 U.S. at 297.
In DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968), the Court went a step further in explaining
the Linkletter criteria. DeStefano refused retroactive application to Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145 (1968), and to Bloom v. Illinois, 891 U.S. 194 (1968), which dealt, respectively,
with jury trials in serious criminal cases and serious criminal contempt cases. The Court
concluded:
[]n the context of the institutions and practices by which we adopt and apply
our criminal laws, the right to jury trial generally tends to prevent arbitrariness
and repression. As we stated in Duncan, "We would not assert, however, that every
criminal trial- or any particular trial-held before a judge alone is unfair or
that a defendant may never be as fairly treated by a judge as he would be by a

jury."
892 U.S. at 633-34.
Subsequently, in Williams v. United States and Elkanich v. United States, 401 U.S. 646
(1971), the Court refused retroactivity to Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). Chimel
dealt with the scope of permissible searches incident to arrest. The Court stated:
Where the major purpose of new constitutional doctrine is to overcome an aspect
of the criminal trial that substantially impairs its truth-finding function and so
raises serious questions about the accuracy of guilty verdicts in past trials, the
new rule has been given complete retroactive effect. Neither good-faith reliance
by state or federal authorities on prior constitutional law or accepted practice, nor
severe impact on the administration of justice has sufficed to require prospective
application in these circumstances.
It is quite different where the purpose of the new constitutional standard
proscribing the use of certain evidence or a particular mode of trial is not to
minimize or avoid arbitrary or unreliable results but to serve other ends. In
these situations the new doctrine raises no question about the guilt of defendants
convicted in prior trials.
401 U.S. at 653.
The cases of Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667 (1971), and United States v. United
States Coin and Currency, 401 U.S. 715 (1971), treated the prior decisions of the Court in
Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968) and Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62
(1968). In Mackey, the Court refused to apply Marchetti and Grosso retroactively since
the use of the wagering tax forms by the prosecutor produced no threat to the reliability
of the fact-finding process involved. In the United States Coin case, on the other hand,
the Court granted retroactive effect to the Marchetti and Grosso decisions as they related
to the defendant. The case involved a forfeiture action brought by the government after
defendant's arrest for failure to register as a gambler and failure to pay a statutory
gambling tax. The Court held that the defendant could invoke Marchetti and Grosso
retroactively since the only purpose of the forfeiture statutes was to penalize persons
significantly involved in crime and "that the conduct being penalized is constitutionally
immune from punishment." 401 U.S. at 724.
In the most recent case dealing with retroactivity, Adams v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 278
(1972), the Court limited Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970) (accused entitled to coun-
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to cases promulgating new constitutional rules of criminal procedure.' 5
The logic behind retroactive application of laws in general is derived from the Blackstonian theory that courts do not make new laws
but merely discover old ones.' 6 That is, the promulgation of a new law
is not a new law at all but merely a correct statement of what the law
has always been. This theory seems most clearly applicable to constitutional law questions since it must be presumed that citizens have
been entitled to the full enjoyment of rights created by that document
since the date of its adoption.
However, the Linkletter Court, after discussing the inroads of
Austinian views in American jurisprudence, 17 concluded that there is
sel at preliminary hearing), to prospective application. Adams cited Gilbert, supra, and
held:
[S]imilarly the role of counsel at the preliminary hearing differs sufficiently from
the role of counsel at trial in its impact upon the integrity of the factfinding
process as to require the weighing of the probabilities of such infection against the
elements of prior justified reliance and the impact of retroactivity upon the
administration of criminal justice.
405 U.S. at 281.
14 Williams. v. United States, 401 US. 646, 651 (1971).
16 458 F.2d at 549. See note 13 supra.
16 The duty of a court, according to Blackstone, is not to "pronounce a new law, but
to maintain and expound the old one." I BLActsoNE CommENTARIMs 69 (15th ed. 1809).
Following this postulate, Blackstone declared the necessity of retroactive application of
overruling decisions:
[Tahese judicial decisions are the principle and the most authoritative evidence
that can be given of the existence of such a custom as shall form a part of the
common law... Yet this rule admits of exception, where the former determination is most evidently contrary to reason. But even in such cases the subsequent
judges do not pretend to make a new law, but to vindicate the old one from misrepresentation. For if it be found that the former decision is manifestly absurd or
unjust, it is declared, not that such a sentence was bad law, but that it was not
law; that is, that it is not the established custom of the realm, as had been erroneously determined.
Id. at 68-71.
This conceptualization was not entirely novel in English law; See 1 M. HALE, HisTORY OF Tm CONBION ~Iv 141 (5th ed. 1794). The Supreme Court followed this theory in
Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425 (1886), holding that unconstitutional action "is,
in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed." Id. at 442.
See Shulman, Retroactive Legislation, 13 ENCYC. Soc. Sc. 355-56 (1934). See generally
Note, Prospective Overrulingand Retroactive Application in the Federal Courts, 71 YAIM
L.J. 907 (1962).
'7 The positivistic jurisprudential philosophy of John Austin (1790-1859) broke with
the traditional Blackstonian approach.
Austin maintained that judges do in fact do something more than discover law;
they make it interstitially by filling in with judicial interpretation the vague,
indefinite, or generic statutory or common-law terms that alone are but the
empty crevices of the law.
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 623-24 (1965).
Austin rejected the fiction that judges merely find the law and thus must give retroactive application to overrule decisions. See G. C ArsiEm, ANALYSIS or AuSrIN'S JUMsPRUDENCE 127 (1877). This commentator has characterized the Blackstonian position as
"absurd." Id. at 186.
Dissatisfaction with the Blackstonian theory emerged in the opinion of Mr. Justice
Holmes in Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 371 (1910). He stated that "a change
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no constitutional or philosophical impediment "to the use of the same
rule in the constitutional area where the exigencies of the situation
require such application."18 The Court later revealed that the "exigencies of the situation" depend upon the purpose of the new rule, the
reliance of officials on the old rule, and the burden to be imposed
upon the administration of justice by retroactive application of the
new rule.'9
The Second Circuit in Flemings makes it clear that these guidelines are irrelevant to O'Callahanwhich is based upon the lack of subject matter jurisdiction. However, some courts have argued that, while
O'Callahanappears to refer to subject matter jurisdiction, in essence,
the decision merely establishes a serviceman's rights to a jury trial and
indictment by grand jury when accused of a non-service connected
crime. 20 This construction is then supported by a citation to De
Stefano v. Woods,21 where the Supreme Court refused to retroactively
apply the right to jury trials for serious offenses.
But the Second Circuit made clear the flaw in this analysis of
O'Callahan:
In construing the decision, it is important to note that the Court
did not in any sense "reform" court-martial procedures or suggest
that current procedures are inadequate in trials for offenses which
are service connected. Nor did the Court suggest that courts-martial
constitutionally could assume jurisdiction over offenses which are
of judicial decision after a contract has been made on the faith of an earlier one the
other way is a change of the law." Mr. Justice Cardozo firmly emplanted the Austinian
approach in the philosophy of the Court in Great N. Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co.,
287 U.S. 358, 364-65 (1932). The state had the option to treat a later decision as "new"
law and thus apply it prospectively rather than adhere to the "ancient dogma that the
law declared by its courts had a Platonic or ideal existence before the act of declara-

tion . . ." This technique of prospective application of overruling decisions came to be
known, appropriately enough, as "sunbursting."
18 381 U.S. at 628.
19 Id. at 636. See also Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967).
20 See Mercer v. Dillon, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 264, 41 C.M.R. 264 (1970), which agreed with
the view that "[O'Callahan] did not rule on the existence of subject-matter jurisdiction,
that it limited the exercise of such jurisdiction and that this limitation is functional only."
19 U.S.C.M.A. at 265, citing United States v. King, ACM 20361, 40 C.M.R. 1030, 1035 (1969).
In Schlomman v. Moseley, 457 F.2d 1223, 1227 (10th Cir. 1972), the court admitted the
jurisdictional nature of the O'Callahan decision but held that this did not dispense with
the duty to decide if the court should, in the interest of justice, make the rule prospective.
Gosa v. Mayden, 450 F.2d 753, 758 (5th Cir. 1971) agreed that the O'Callahanrationale dealt
with adjudicatory power but held that retroactive application was not automatically required for that reason. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit saw O'Callahanas creating newly adjudicated constitutional rights and found for prospectivity after an application
of the purpose, reliance, effect test. Id. at 763-67. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297
(1967), discussed supra note 13; Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636, 639-40 (1965), discussed supra note 11.
21392 U.S. 631 (1968).
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not service connected if they provided the protective benefits of a
22
grand jury indictment and trial by jury
Although O'Callahanspecified its intent to protect the right to a
jury trial and the right to indictment by grand jury,23 it is clear that
the difference between civilian and military courts goes far beyond
these two privileges. 24 As Mr. Justice Douglas stated in the majority
opinion, "[a] court-martial is not yet an independent instrument of
justice but remains to a significant degree a specialized part of the
overall mechanism by which military discipline is preserved." 25 To
read O'Callahanas merely stating new definitions of constitutionally
protected rights is to ignore all but one line of the opinion.26 Yet this
27
view has been adopted by several courts.
However, no circuit court of appeals has chosen to ignore the
jurisdictional issue. Nevertheless, in Gosa v. Mayden28 and Schlomann v. Moseley,29 the Fifth and Tenth Circuits, respectively, found
that O'Callahanshould be applied prospectively. Gosa recognized that
the judicial declaration of the unconstitutionality of a federal law
granting subject matter jurisdiction is unique. However, the court also
reasoned that, although judgments of courts without jurisdiction are
void, it does not inevitably follow that such a declaration demands
retroactive effect. 30 The court then went on to state that the jurisdic22 458 F.2d at 550 (2d Cir. 1972).
23 395 U.S. at 273.

We have concluded that the crime to be under military jurisdiction must be
service connected, lest 'cases arising in land or naval forces, or in the Militia,
when in actual service in time of War or public danger,' as used in the Fifth
Amendment, be expanded to deprive every member of the armed services of the
benefits of an indictment by a grand jury and a trial by a jury of his peers.
Id. 272-73.
24 Id. at 263-66. Mr. Justice Douglas, citing United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350
U.S. 11, 17-18 (1955), pointed out that the Constitution does not provide for life tenure for
judges of military trials. Judges are appointed by military commanders and may be removed
at will. Salaries are also not protected. A court-martial is tried, not by a jury, but by a
panel of officers who can act by two-thirds vote. At the time O'Callahan was convicted, a
court-martial was presided over by a law officer who could be a direct subordinate to the
officer who convened the court-martial. Access to process for obtaining evidence and wit-

nesses for the defense is to a significant extent dependent upon the approval of the prosecution. Mr. Justice Douglas also noted the ever present danger of command influence over a
proceeding by an officer who convenes the court-martial, selects its members and counsel
and often has command authority over its members. See generally Symposium -Military
Law, 10 Am. CraM. L. REv. 1-162 (1971); Sherman, The Civilization of Military Law, 22
MAINE L. REv. 3, 87-97 (1970); Quinn, Some Comparisons Between Courts-Martial and
Civilian Practice, 15 U.C.L.A. L. R y. 1240 (1968).
2r 395 US. at 265.
20 See id. at 272-73; note 23 supra.
27 See note 20 supra.
28450 F.2d 753 (5th Cir. 1971).
29 457 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1972).
30 This, of course, is logically unsound. But there is no logical way to reach the conclusion the Gosa court wished to reach. '
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tional aspect of the O'Callahan holding is only secondary, resulting
from "a new adjudication of a constitutional right."81 The O'Caflahan
decision is, therefore, analogous to Bloom v. Illinois3 2 "or any other
new or altered adjudication that changes the fundamental rights of
3
those accused of crime."
The Tenth Circuit, in Schlomann, took a different approach than
the Fifth Circuit although it, too, recognized the jurisdictional nature
of O'Callahan. However, the court ruled that, since O'Callahanwas
"a clear break with the past," it was bound to inquire whether the
interests of justice mandate that the decision be applied only prospectively.34 The court argued basically as follows: O'Callahan concerns
constitutional rights and criminal cases of this type have been applied
prospectively; O'Callahanalso concerns jurisdiction and civil cases of
this type have been applied prospectively. 35 However, the court did
not draw its conclusion from this analysis. Rather, it proceeded to note
that the Supreme Court has held that "retroactivity does not turn on
the value of the constitutional guarantee involved."'33 The court then
concluded "that retroactivity likewise does not turn on whether a juris37
dictional ruling is involved."
Logically, O'Callahan should be applied retroactively. If this is
not abundantly clear from the simple concepts involved, 8 the opinions
of the Fifth and Tenth Circuits demonstrate that no sound Euclidian
argument can be made without introducing new concepts.3 9 Even then,
logical argument still impels the adoption of the retroactive application of O'Callahan.Indeed, O'Callahanitself is retroactive in that it
was promulgated on a petition for habeas corpus.

4°

31450 F.2d at 758.
82 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
33 450 F.2d at 759.
34 457 F.2d at 1227.
35 This analysis brings into clear focus the uniqueness of O'Callahan. It concerns
criminal, constitutional and jurisdictional elements.
36 457 F.2d at 1228.
37 Id.
38 I.e., judgments without jurisdiction are void.

89 See note 30 and accompanying text supra.
40 But this fact does not necessarily mandate retroactivity. In deciding a case that
frees the defendant at bar and applies to those tried after the decision but not those tried
at the same time as the defendant whose case is chosen as the Constitutional vehicle, the
Court has the following attitude: the fate of the individual defendant is not relevant -his
freedom is a mere consequence of the Constitutional prohibition against advisory opinions.
That is, the Supreme Court cannot proclaim new Constitutional standards except when it
is "deciding cases" and could not, therefore, have announced, prior to deciding the
"vehicle" case, a principle that would have saved others tfied before the appeal reached it.
See, e.g., Stovall v. Denmo, 388 U.S. 293, 301 (1967); see also Pickelsimer v. Wainwright,
375 U.S. 2, 3 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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Nevertheless, logic should not be followed if it leads to impractical results. The burdensome impact of a retroactive application upon
the administration of justice may be sufficient in itself to mandate
prospective application. In this case, the burden may be an intolerable
waste of time and resources. As the Second Circuit notes, "[n]ot only
will discharge records have to be changed, but questions of retroactive
pay and veterans benefits will be involved." 41
In short, the question is whether there is a probability that inno42
cent defendants have been unconstitutionally deprived of their rights.
That is, does the preference of a civilian forum over a military one
go to the "integrity of the truth-finding process?" 43 If not, the classifi41458 F.2d at 555.
It is not unreasonable to speculate that the military forum is inherently incapable
of providing the same safeguards against arbitrary law enforcement as does its civilian
counterpart. The most serious difficulty with the military tribunal is that officers drawn
from the ranks of the units on post are detailed by the commander to perform the duty of
court-martial officer. See 10 U.S.C. § 825 (1968). The same commander who appoints the
court-martial officer also rates his general job performance in his Officer Efficiency Report
(OER). See Army Reg. 623-105 (1972). A favorable efficiency report is paramount in the
determination of the officer's promotion potential. See Army Reg. 624-100, § 17 (1972).
Despite strict statutory and regulatory authority (10 U.S.C. § 837 (1970); Army Reg.
42

623-105, § 1-3 (g), (f) (1972)), there exists no practical method to insure that a commander's
unfavorable rating on an OER will not be based on a performance inimical to the commander's personal interests while serving as a court-martial officer.
This problem was compounded in the past by the fact that, in summary courts-martial,
the accused had no right to legal counsel. In light of Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25
(1972), this difficulty has been alleviated. See Daigle v. Warner, - F. Supp. - (D. Hawaii
1972) (legal counsel required for summary courts-martial).
43 See note 13 supra. The Court has always applied new rules retroactively where the
purpose of the new rule goes to the integrity of the truth determining process and would
therefore cast doubt upon the conviction of anyone tried under the old rule. In Johnson v.
New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 728-29 (1966), the Court stated:

Finally, we emphasize that the question whether a constitutional rule of criminal
procedure does or does not enhance the reliability of the fact-finding process at
trial is necessarily a matter of degree.... We are thus concerned with a question
of probabilities and must take account, among other factors, of the extent to
which other safeguards are available to protect the integrity of the truthdetermining process at trial.
In the following cases, the Court found that the integrity of the truth determining process
has been violated: United States v. United States Coin and Currency, 401 U.S. 715 (1971)
(forfeiture decree based on unconstitutional federal statute requiring gamblers to register
and pay tax); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 US. 711 (1969) (guarantee against double
jeopardy applicable to the states); Berger v. California, 393 U.S. 314 (1969) (state must make
good faith effort to secure a personal appearance by out of state witness before it can use
his testimony); Arsenault v. Massachusetts, 393 US. 5 (1968) (right to counsel extends to
preliminary hearings where defendant enters a plea and such plea is placed in evidence
at a later trial); McConnell v. Rhay, 393 U.S. 2 (1968) (right to counsel for probation proceedings or proceedings for imposition of deferred sentence); Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S.
293 (1968) (new rule with regard to joint trial confessions); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391
U.S. 510 (1968) (improper exclusion of jurors because of their objection to capital punishment); Smith v. Crouse, 378 U.S. 584 (1964) (right of indigent to counsel on appeal);
McNerlin v. Denno, 378 U.S. 575 (1964) (exclusionary rule against coerced confessions);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right of indigent to counsel); Eskridge v. Washington State Board of Prison Terms and Paroles, 357 U.S. 214 (1958) (indigent entitled to
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cation of O'Callahan as "a clear break with the past" requiring consideration of the merits of retroactivity4 4 is the preferred road despite
its academic deficiencies. In this way, it can be applied prospectively
and yet distinguished from the immutable rule that judgments without jurisdiction are void.
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY OF FEDERAL AGENTS

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
The Supreme Court in the case of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents 4 5 took an historic step by recognizing an aggrieved citizen's
federal common law right to sue "federal officers" who violate fourth
amendment prohibitions. 46 However, the Court left open the question
of sovereign immunity and remanded the case to the Second Circuit
for a ruling on that issue.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity is essentially a creature of
judicial origin.47 Immunity from civil liability was first extended to
members of the judiciary.48 Later, this protection was also afforded to
free transcript on appeal). Contra, Dobbyn, Prospective Limitation of ConstitutionalDeci-

sions in Criminal Cases, 36 Mo. L. REv. 801, 804, (1971) (Dobbyn refutes the idea that the
Court has genuinely relied on the integrity of the fact-finding process and espouses the
view that the Court has applied new rules prospectively in cases where there has been
an uncalled for usurpation of legislative power). See generally Mishkin, The Supreme Court
1964 Term-Foreword: The High Court, The Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time
and Law, 79 HARv. L. Rav. 56, 97-101 (1965); Schwartz, Retroactivity, Reliability, and
Due Process: A Reply to Professor Mishkin, 83 U. Cui. L. R v. 719 (1966).
44 See text accompanying note 34 supra.

45 403 US. 388 (1971).
46 The Court relied heavily on the principle announced in Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678
at 684 (1946): ". .. [W]here legal rights have been invaded, and a federal statute provides
for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy
to make good the wrong done." (quoted in 403 U.S. at 396).
47 The Constitution establishes a privilege which is limited to members of Congress
and which, during the periods when that body is in session, shields the members from arrest
while they are in the conduct of their duties. The provision is intended to insure free speech
and debate in the Congress. U.S. CONsr. art. II, § 6. It is interesting to note that the Supreme Court first came to grips with the doctrine of sovereign immunity in a suit against a
state. In Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1792), the Court held that the state of
Georgia was not a sovereign within the meaning of the doctrine and was not, therefore,
immune. This case subsequently led to the adoption of the eleventh amendment. However,
it was not until 1834 that the Court said, by way of dictum in United States v. Clarke, 33
U.S. (8 Pet.) 436, that the national government, when appearing as a party to a suit, is entitled to invoke this doctrine. Twelve years later, the doctrine became more firmly settled as
a principle of American jurisprudence in United States v. McLemore, 45 US. (4 How.) 286
(1846). Finally, in 1868, the Supreme Court stated that, "[it is a familiar doctrine of common law that a sovereign cannot be sued in his own court without his consent." The
Siren, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 152, 154.
48 Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871). Speaking for the majority, Mr.
Justice Field said, "[flit is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper
administration of justice, that a judicial officer in exercising the authority vested in him,
shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal conse-

